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A Misconstrued Approach to ‘Family Life’ 
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 (The City Law School, City, University of London) 
 
 ABSTRACT 
This article criticizes the exclusion of the relationship between parents and adult children from the 
purview of Article 8 ECHR in Strasbourg judgments, save for exceptional cases of dependency, 
narrowly defined (in practice reduced to disability). The author notes that this restrictive approach 
has been developed in the politically sensitive area of immigration policy and might stem from 
judicial pragmatism. She supports a more inclusive interpretation of ‘family life’, on two grounds. 
Firstly, it would align the Court’s stance on adult relatives with its well-established purposive 
reading of the notion of ‘family life’. In fact, family arrangements between adult relatives usually 
continue to exhibit the ‘signposts’ of family life identified in landmark decisions: genetic filiation, 
emotional bonds and effective ties; moreover, in cases without a cross-border element, the Court 
has recognised the applicability of Article 8 to close bonds with near relatives, such as 
grandparents. Secondly, bringing adult relatives within the scope of Article 8 would avoid the gap 
between the legal interpretation of ‘family life’ and the sociological understanding of the family as 
a group defined by a shared identity, caring, economic cooperation (including financial support, 
domestic labour, childcare and elderly care), sometimes co-residence. Whilst the Court may 
accommodate legitimate State interests when assessing the merits of a complaint, the failure to 
acknowledge the relationship between parents and adult children as ‘family life’ at the admissibility 
stage does not reflect social reality and prevents any judicial scrutiny over measures interfering with 
the normal development of such relationships. 
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
More than any other provision in the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter ‘ECHR’ 
or ‘Convention’), the concise reference to a ‘right to respect for family life’ in Article 8 has given 
rise to a multiplicity of practical applications in Strasbourg litigation, ranging from human 
fertilisation and embryology legislation to rules governing married couples’ choice of family name, 
and from parental leave entitlements to family reunification claims in immigration proceedings 
(Draghici, 2017: 30-36 and passim). Moreover, due to the purposive interpretation of the notion of 
‘family life’ by the ECHR monitoring bodies, the relationships caught by Article 8 have gone so far 
as to encompass aspiring parents and children formally adopted abroad but with whom they had 
never lived,
1
 a transsexual and a child biologically unrelated to him born through assisted 
reproduction to a partner with whom he had no legal ties
2
 as well as public foster carers and 
unrelated looked-after children.
3
 Despite this elasticity of Article 8, one category of familial ties that 
has remained outside its scope is the relationship between adult children and their (often ageing) 
parents. For the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ‘ECtHR’ or ‘the Court’), family life 
2 
 
appears to suffer a hiatus after the children reach majority until such time as elderly parents become 
their children’s ‘dependents’ in the narrowest of terms.4  
This article maintains that the overemphasis on the nuclear family made up of parents and 
minor dependent children (or social groups emulating that model)
5
 is a regrettable anomaly in the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence, and is at odds with the Court’s own criteria for defining ‘family life’, as 
well as with the reality of everyday family arrangements. The next section examines Strasbourg 
cases concerning adult children and their parents and criticises the unrealistically high threshold of 
dependency required in order to engage Article 8, largely confined to disability. The author notes 
that the judicial approach described has been developed in the politically sensitive area of 
immigration proceedings (with the notable exception of second-generation migrants awaiting 
deportation, treated more sympathetically by the Court)
6
 and hypothesizes that the narrow meaning 
of ‘family life’ in that context might be a result of judicial pragmatism.7 This stream of case-law is 
contrasted with the landmark cases on the scope of Article 8, including ‘signposts’ such as 
biological affiliation corroborated by effective social ties and the recognition of close bonds with 
near relatives (grandparents and collateral ascendants).
8
 The article further argues that there is a 
notable gap between the social understanding of ‘family life’ in European countries and the legal 
understanding of ‘family life’ under Article 8 ECHR according to the meaning attributed to it in 
Strasbourg. To that end, it relies on the notion of ‘family’ in the sociological literature as a group 
defined not by strict dependency but rather by a shared identity, as well as caring and economic 
cooperation, including financial support, domestic labour and sometimes co-residence.
9
 Against this 
background, the conclusions suggest that a more appropriate reading of the right to ‘respect for 
family life’ under Article 8 is that State obligations may vary depending on the nature of the family 
bonds at stake; however, an interpretation failing to acknowledge the relationship between parents 
and their adult children as ‘family life’ altogether is excessively restrictive and does not reflect 
social reality. Far from being a merely doctrinal issue, the acceptance of parents and adult children 
as falling within the ambit of Article 8 would entail judicial scrutiny over measures interfering with 
the normal development of their relationship, placing the burden on State authorities to justify 




II. THE EXCLUSION OF PARENTS AND THEIR ADULT CHILDREN FROM THE 
PROTECTION OF ARTICLE 8 
 
1. Family life predicated on dependency 
 
The exclusion of the relationship between parents and their adult children from the protection of 
Article 8 can be traced back to the 1984 decision of the now defunct European Commission on 
Human Rights (hereinafter ‘ECmHR’ or ‘the Commission’) in S and S v United Kingdom.10 The 
case regarded the British authorities’ refusal to allow an Indian woman to re-join her adult son in 
the UK after an extended visit to India, although she had previously shared a residence with her son 
for several years in the UK and she had produced medical evidence of mental health issues, in 
particular depression and anxiety, exacerbated by the separation from her son. The Commission 
declared the complaint ill-founded on the following ground: 
‘Generally, the protection of family life under Article 8 involves cohabiting dependents, 
such as parents and their dependent, minor children. Whether it extends to other 
relationships depends on the circumstances of the particular case. Relationships between 
[adult relatives] would not necessarily acquire the protection of Article 8 of the Convention 
without evidence of further elements of dependency, involving more than the normal, 
emotional ties.’11  
 
The immediate consequence of restricting the notion of ‘family life’ to the nuclear family and 
establishing a high threshold for dependency between adult relatives is that claims brought by 
parents and their adult children are destined to fail at the admissibility stage, without allowing for a 
proper inquiry into the nature, rationale and proportionality of the alleged interference.  
The Court took the same view in a substantial number of cases spread over two decades. It 
thus reiterated the Commission’s stance verbatim in cases such as Kwakye-Nti and Dufie v The 
Netherlands, Ezzouhdi v France, Konstantinov v The Netherlands, and A.H. Khan v UK.
12
  The 
Grand Chamber in Slivenko v Latvia later provided a restatement of the S and S principle, 
emphasizing the distinction between the ‘core family’ and other family members, as well as the 
notion of dependency:   
‘the existence of “family life” could not be relied on by the applicants in relation to [their] 
elderly parents, adults who did not belong to the core family and who have not been shown to 
have been dependent members of the applicants’ family…’.13 
 
This wording was replicated in subsequent cases, for instance Sisojeva and others v Latvia and 
Shevanova v Latvia.
14
 The Court appeared to show some hesitation in Omojudi v UK; since the 
respondent government had conceded that the applicant’s deportation interfered with his family life 
with his wife and two youngest children, the Court found it ‘unnecessary to decide whether the 
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close bond which the applicant undoubtedly had with his eldest son and his granddaughter was 
itself sufficient to give rise to family life between them’.15 Moreover, the Court seemed to suggest 
that family life did exist with the adult child and the grandchild when it proceeded to apply its usual 
‘insurmountable obstacles’ test to ascertain if family life could be recreated elsewhere.16 However, 
this appears to be a mere ad abundantiam argument, as the Court had already determined that there 
were insurmountable obstacles to the relocation abroad of the applicant’s minor children born in the 
UK. It does not follow that the exclusive reliance on the relationship with an adult child as ‘family 
life’ (even less so if there are no grandchildren involved) will succeed. In fact, the subsequent  
decision in Senchishak v Finland (concerning the alleged dependency of an elderly and disabled 





2. A high threshold for ‘dependency’ 
 
More problematically, the Court appears quite restrictive in what it is prepared to construe as 
dependency. In Sarközi and Mahran v Austria, it held that ‘the existence of family life could not be 
relied on concerning adults who have not substantiated a particular dependency between them…’.18 
The threshold was emphatically presented as narrow, without further guidance as to what qualifies 
as a particular dependency. In some cases, the Court concludes that there was no dependency but 
glosses over the issue without providing a detailed assessment. For instance, in Samsonnikov v 
Estonia,
19
 the Court merely stated that no family life existed between the applicant and his father 
and brother without engaging with the applicant’s submission; it had been alleged that the 
relationship between the applicant and his ageing father was based on financial support and mutual 
aid,
20
 and the government’s rebuttal was limited to the observation that they lived separately.21 
Considering that in other cases the Court had made it clear that co-residence is not dispositive of the 
issue of whether family life exists,
22
 this would have arguably required further analysis. 
Disappointingly, in Ezzouhdi v France, co-residence was explicitly rejected as evidence of 
dependency capable of attracting the protection of Article 8 (whether alone or together with other 
factors) in cases involving adult relatives.
23
 It is submitted that co-residence, understood as living 
together as a single household (rather than merely under the same roof) and partaking in day-to-day 
activities (sharing meals, dividing domestic chores, pooling resources),
24
 should be treated as a 
strong indicator of family life.  
The case of Senchishak v Finland
25
 is probably the most conspicuous illustration of the 
Court’s restrictive assessment of dependency. The Court in this case declared inadmissible the 
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Article 8 complaint of an elderly and disabled mother removed from Finland, where she had lived 
for several years in the care of her daughter, who was a naturalised Finnish citizen. The Court failed 
to adequately explain why age, disability, effective bonds and co-residence are insufficient to attract 
the protection of Article 8, especially in a case where there were no other family members in the 
country of origin able to provide the requisite care. Admittedly, the Court was entitled to take into 
account the fact that the period of co-residence followed the overstaying of a tourist visa; otherwise, 
States would be faced with a fait accompli whenever family members whose immigration status is 
irregular manage to stay in the country long enough (living under the same roof) to later invoke 
‘family life’. This would also create the wrong incentive in the immigration system. However, a 
disabled elderly parent’s need for family care should be treated as sufficient on its own to 
substantiate dependency, even if no weight is given to prior co-residence. At the same time, co-
residence (albeit in irregular circumstances) should be seen as giving credence to the adult child’s 
readiness and ability to care for the parent in the event that the latter is granted leave to remain. 
Most worryingly, for the Court, the dependency on the adult child was negated by the availability of 
care institutions for elderly persons:  
‘Even assuming that the applicant is dependent on outside help in order to cope with her 
daily life, this does not mean that she is necessarily dependent on her daughter who lives in 
Finland, or that care in Finland is the only option. As mentioned earlier, there are both 
private and public care institutions in Russia, and it is also possible to hire external help.’26 
  
Whilst in principle one may sympathize with any underlying concerns over opening the 
floodgates for similar claims, the Court appears here to be unduly dismissive of normal family 
dynamics involving the care of elderly parents by their children. Even making allowance for States’ 
wide margin of appreciation in matters pertaining to immigration policy, it could be argued that, in 
principle, citizens and long-term residents should not have to choose between depriving a foreign 
elderly parent of care or abandoning their homes and livelihood (and possibly uprooting their own 
children and a partner unfamiliar with the parent’s native country); any such situations should 
require justification and judicial scrutiny. However, a debate on the proper balancing between 
individual rights and any interests of the community cannot take place in Strasbourg proceedings 
since the excessively narrow definition of dependency between adult relatives currently removes 
such situations from the purview of Article 8.  
The cases concerning adult relatives where Article 8 was found to be engaged were highly 
exceptional. Anam v UK
27
 is a rare example of successful reliance on family life between adult 
relatives; the Court accepted that the applicant, who suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, had a 
‘higher degree of reliance on his mother and adult siblings than other adults as a result of his 
diagnosed mental health problems’, even though his deportation to Bangladesh following his 
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repeated convictions for violent offences was ultimately found to constitute a proportionate 
interference. Similarly, the recognition in F.N. v UK of a familial relationship between adult 
relatives was predicated on the fact that ‘the applicant lived with and was more than usually 
dependent on her aunt as a result of her vulnerable mental state’.28 The applicant in this case was a 
young Ugandan woman who had arrived in the UK on a fraudulent passport and subsequently 
applied for asylum unsuccessfully. She had resided with her aunt, her only surviving relation, for 
over eight years, while her immigration status remained uncertain, relying on her aunt for financial 
as well as emotional support, as she suffered from anxiety and depression. In Emonet v 
Switzerland,
29
 a non-immigration case, the Court also found ‘family life’ engaged on account of the 
adult child’s disability. The latter case regarded a 30-year-old paraplegic woman who depended on 
the care and support of her mother and her mother’s former cohabitant, whom she regarded as a 
father. All parties had agreed that the man ought to adopt her in order to consolidate their 
relationship in the eyes of the law; however, the unintended effect of the adoption order, challenged 
in domestic and Strasbourg proceedings, was that it extinguished the mother’s parental status. In 
deciding that Article 8 applied to the relationship between the parties, the Court noted that 
additional factors of dependence other than normal ties of affection existed, due to the constant care 
required by the adult child.   
The commonalities between the cases of Emonet, F.N. and Anam would suggest that in 
practice nothing short of disability (mental or physical, typically of the descendant) can persuade 
the Court that dependency between adult relatives has been substantiated. This stance amounts to 
saying that the Convention law only assimilates vulnerable adult children to family members, by 
unuttered analogy with minors. Equating ‘family life’ with disability-induced vulnerability is on 
any view a very narrow understanding of the substance of familial association. 
 
3. Adult relatives as ‘private life’- a doubtful concession 
 
In a number of cases regarding challenges to deportation orders, adult long-term residents (usually 
migrants arrived in the host country at a very young age) have been able to invoke their family life 
with relatives other than partners or minor children, in particular with parents and adult siblings. In 
Nasri v France, the alien subject to a deportation order for criminal conduct was hearing impaired 
and unable to speak, illiterate and with no command of any sign language, and had always lived 
with his parents;
30
 in accepting the applicability of Article 8, the Court made no reference to its 
earlier restrictive approach in S and S to adult relatives, but emphasized that ‘for a person 
confronted with such obstacles, the family is especially important, not only in terms of providing a 
7 
 
home, but also because it can help to prevent him from lapsing into a life of crime’.31 In 
Boughanemi v France,
32
 the Court found that the applicant had ‘private and family life’ in France 
(without distinguishing between the two limbs of Article 8) insofar as he had a child, as well as 
parents and siblings; most of the discussion on the applicability of Article 8 revolved around the 
belated recognition of paternity in respect of an illegitimate child born to a non-cohabiting partner, 
whereas the analysis of the relationship with the parents and siblings was extremely cursory: ‘Mr 
Boughanemi’s parents and his ten brothers and sisters are legally resident in France and there is no 
evidence that he has no ties with them’.33 Interestingly, the Court appears to start from the 
presumption that the second-generation migrant enjoys family life with adult relatives lawfully 
residing in the country and that the burden falls on the State to demonstrate that there are no actual 
ties. The focus on social integration is even clearer in Boujlifa v France; noting that the applicant 
had lived in France since the age of five, had received his schooling there, ‘and his parents and his 
eight brothers and sisters – with whom he seems to have remained in touch – live there’, the Court 
was ‘in no doubt that the measure complained of amounts to interference with the applicant’s right 
to respect for his private and family life’.34 There are numerous other examples in which second-
generation migrants successfully invoke the relationship with adult relatives in the context of 
deportation proceedings despite the questionable effectiveness of ties. The Court was thus satisfied 
that Article 8 applied where parents and siblings were lawful residents of the deporting State and 
the applicant ‘had never broken off relations with them’,35 had ‘remained in contact’ with them,36 or 
even less; in Ezzouhdi v France ‘family life’ was engaged merely because the deportee’s mother 
and siblings ‘resided there’.37  
It would seem that the foreign offender’s social integration in the host country has as an 
automatic corollary the privilege of invoking family life with adult relatives who reside there legally 
with no qualitative threshold whatsoever. In other deportation decisions (Bouchelkia v France, 
Maslov v Austria), the Court has also accepted that, in the case of young adults who have not yet 
founded a family of their own and continue to live with their parents, that relationship constitutes 
‘family life’.38 Indeed for second-generation migrants, private life and family life appear 
indistinguishable at times. In Üner v The Netherlands, another case regarding a challenge to an 
expulsion order, the Court was prepared to recognize that the ‘totality of social ties between settled 
migrants and the community in which they are living constitute part of the concept of “family 
life”’.39  
The scholarship has explained the more protective approach to Article 8 in such cases as 
driven by a concern to safeguard the individual’s private life in the host country, which is a broader 
concept. According to Cholewinski, ‘some of the considerations which the Strasbourg organs 
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viewed as outweighing the legitimate aim of the deporting authorities had little relevance to family 
life’; in fact, the judicial agenda was ‘based on the premise that second-generation migrants … 
should effectively be treated as de facto citizens, with the result that expulsion from their country of 
residence can hardly ever be justified’ (Cholewinski, 1994: 298). Thym has similarly argued that 
the protection afforded in deportation cases involving second-generation migrants is actually less 
connected to the family life of the applicants and more to their private life, even if the Court does 
not renounce the reference to family links (Thym, 2014: 114).
40
  
In several recent pronouncements (Slivenko v Latvia, Shevanova v Latvia, Sarközi and 
Mahran v Austria), the Court refined its stance on this matter and explicitly shifted the attention to 
private life, accepting that relationships between adult relatives ‘may be protected under the notion 
of “private life” for the purposes of Article 8, depending on the degree of social integration of the 
persons concerned’.41 In all those cases, the applicants were long-term residents who already had 
extensive ‘private life’ ties in the host country, sometimes forged after decades of residence, and 
therefore this concession added nothing to the analysis of the case. In fact, if the applicant’s social 
integration is already demonstrated and hence the ‘private life’ limb of Article 8 applies, the 
recognition of relationships with adult relatives as further evidence of private life is largely 
superfluous (as well as playing a marginal role in the assessment of proportionality). Otherwise 
said, adult relatives become ‘private life’ only if ‘private life’ is already amply demonstrated 
through other means, such as length of residence and education in the host country.  
Moreover, there is a bizarre inequity in the Court’s preferential approach to relationships 
between adult relatives in cases regarding the proposed deportation of second-generation migrants. 
Whereas integrated aliens may successfully invoke such relationships to challenge a deportation 
order following criminal convictions, often for violent offences (Boughanemi, Nasri), a less 
favourable treatment is applied to law-abiding naturalized citizens who wish to be joined by a 
foreign parent requiring care (Senchishak)
42
 or children left behind in the country of origin 
(Kwakye-nti and Dufie).
43
 In the latter cases, the Court pays no attention to the social ties that 
naturalized citizens would lose in their adoptive home country if required to relocate in order to 
maintain substantial contact with children having reached majority or to look after their elderly 
parents. From a private life perspective, such citizens or long-term residents stand to lose just as 
much as second-generation migrants if compelled to move to be able to pursue family interests. 
Moreover, this double standard suggests that an individual loses ‘family life’ ties with the original 
family simply by virtue of crossing a border. 
Arguably, the normalcy of a citizen’s (or settled resident’s) family life comprises the ability 
to maintain reasonable contact with their children after they reach majority and to provide care for 
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their ageing parents. Moreover, the focus in Strasbourg proceedings should not be exclusively on 
the rights of the alien seeking leave to enter or remain, but also on those of the resident or citizen 
with whom they have, or wish to resume, family life. Carens has aptly emphasized the moral 
obligation a State has towards citizens or lawful residents to consider their right to family life with 
relatives seeking entry, even though the latter are not yet within the State’s jurisdiction and 
therefore not entitled to protection themselves:  
‘The state’s obligation to admit family members living elsewhere is derived not so much 
from the claims of those seeking to enter as the claims of those they seek to join: citizens or 
residents or others who have been admitted for an extended period’ (Carens, 2013: 186, 
emphasis added).  
 
The generalized acknowledgement of family relationships between adult children and their parents 
as falling within the scope of Article 8 would correct the imbalance in the Court’s approach to cases 
regarding family reunion as opposed to removal of settled immigrants.  
 
4. An immigration-specific notion of ‘family life’? 
 
It is apparent from the overview of the case-law undertaken so far that the issue of whether or not 
parents and their adult children qualify as ‘family life’ under Article 8 has arisen predominantly in 
immigration cases. It is therefore impossible not to surmise that the context in which the question 
was put before the Convention bodies influenced the outcome. The Court’s acute awareness of the 
immigration context was manifest in Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v UK:  
 
‘the Court cannot ignore that the present case is concerned not only with family life but also 
with immigration and that, as a matter of well-established international law and subject to its 
treaty obligations, a State has the right to control the entry of non-nationals into its 
territory’.44 
 
Occasionally, the Court itself seemed to recognize that it attributes a specific meaning to the notion 
of ‘family life’ (almost exclusively applicable to the core family) in the context of immigration-
related cases. In Slivenko v Latvia it expressly circumscribed its understanding of ‘family life’ to the 
substantive area at hand: 
 
‘In the Convention case-law relating to expulsion and extradition measures, the main 
emphasis has consistently been placed on the “family life” aspect, which has been 
interpreted as encompassing the effective “family life” established in the territory of a 
Contracting State by aliens lawfully resident there, it being understood that “family life” in 




Furthermore, the different standard for measuring dependency on family members in immigration 
cases, even where children are still underage, is clearly encapsulated in the Court’s own account of 
its jurisprudence in Tuquabo-Tekle v The Netherlands:  
‘The Court has indeed previously rejected cases involving failed applications for family 
reunion and complaints under Article 8 where the children concerned had in the meantime 
reached an age where they were presumably not as much in need of care as young children 
and increasingly able to fend for themselves’.46  
 
It is also worth noting that in cases involving minor children left behind, although the Court usually 
does find Article 8 engaged, it concludes that the parent’s new State of residence has no obligation 
to allow those concerned to enjoy a more substantial degree of family life on its territory than the 





 provides an example of the application of the dependency principle in a 
non-immigration context, namely with reference to the legal effects of adoption proceedings. In this 
case the Court did find additional factors present besides emotional ties, in particular the adult 
child’s disability, but it is not far-fetched to assume that the Court preserved its earlier position in S 
and S/ Slivenko insofar as a change in jurisprudence was not needed in the case at hand in order to 
find Article 8 applicable.  
This narrow meaning of family life for the purposes of immigration claims, with the 
exception of second-generation migrants awaiting deportation, may be a concession to State 
sovereignty. Arguably, however, any such concession should be made not at the admissibility stage, 
by rejecting the applicability of Article 8, but, where warranted, at the proportionality stage of the 
analysis of the merits. It may thus be perfectly reasonable for a State to deport, or refuse entry to, an 
alien who poses a threat to the community or would be a burden on the social security system, 
notwithstanding the presence of their parents or adult children on its territory. The Court may find 
that an elderly relative is likely to rely on the host State’s health care system or that the adult child 
will have to give up work to act as a full-time carer, with implications for the economy of the host 
State, and hence limitations or the request of proof of financial capacity to meet the needs of the 
parent may be legitimate. However, the Court should be able to scrutinize decisions such as the 
refusal of a tourist visa for a family visit by the elderly parent who is not a dependant, or of the 
admission of an elderly parent who, without being financially dependent or disabled, is in advanced 
age and has no other family members to care for them in the country of origin (especially where the 
child with whom they seek reunification is a citizen or permanent resident of the requested country). 
The Court’s decision whether to accommodate the public policy considerations in Article 8(2) 
should intervene at the second stage of the analysis, rather than through the refusal to entertain the 





III. THE CASE FOR A MORE INCLUSIVE UNDERSTANDING OF ‘FAMILY LIFE’ UNDER 
THE ECHR 
 
1. Achieving greater consistency within Article 8 case-law 
 
The aforementioned cases concerning adult child - (elderly) parent relationships reveal a 
particularly restrictive interpretation of ‘family life’ as limited to the nuclear family, 
uncharacteristic of ECHR jurisprudence under Article 8. In fact, the Strasbourg authorities have 
based their interpretation on a functional definition of families, which revolves around the 
effectiveness of emotional and economic bonds. As the Grand Chamber highlighted in K and T v 
Finland, ‘the existence or non-existence of “family life” is essentially a question of fact depending 
upon the real existence in practice of close personal ties’.49   
On that basis, Article 8 has been found applicable not only to traditional family units 
grounded on marital bonds and legitimate affiliation, but also to parents and their natural children 
(Marckx v Belgium, Keegan v Ireland),
50
 including adulterous children (Johnston et al v Ireland, 
Kroon v The Netherlands, Merger and Cros v France, X and Y v Switzerland),
51
 as well as 
biological children of a spouse (Söderbäck v Sweden)
52
 or of a same-sex domestic partner (X v 
Austria).
53
 The protection of Article 8 was further extended to the relationship between a man and 
his former adoptive child (Kurochkin v Ukraine)
54
 and to the relationship between a biological 
father and his adulterous children in relation to whom the mother’s husband was the legal father, 
insofar as the former was the actual caregiver (Chavdarov v Bulgaria).
55
 Similarly, family life was 
found to exist between (minor) siblings (Olsson v Sweden (No 1),
56
 Mustafa and Armağan Akın v 
Turkey).
57
 Significantly, the case law has recognized that ‘family life’ exists beyond the core 
family, in particular between children and grandparents (Marckx v Belgium, Pla and Puncernau v 
Andorra)
58
 as well as nephews and uncles (Boyle v UK).
59
 As explained in Marckx:  
‘In the Court’s opinion, “family life”, within the meaning of Article 8, includes at least the 
ties between near relatives, for instance those between grandparents and grandchildren, since 
such relatives may play a considerable part in family life.’60 
  
Admittedly, in cases such as Marckx and Boyle, where relationships within the extended 
family were included in the ambit of Article 8, minor children were involved. However, there was 
no reference to the welfare of minors or to economic dependency in those judgments; rather, there 
was a more general concern to give recognition to social relationships within an individual’s close 
family circle built on caring and support. In Boyle v UK, the Commission based its acknowledgment 
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of family life on the existence of ‘frequent contact’, ‘considerable time’ spent together and a 
‘significant bond’.61 Moreover, Article 8 was also found applicable in Pla and Puncernau, a case 
concerning the interpretation of a testamentary disposition resulting in the exclusion of an adult 
adoptive grand-child from his grandmother’s estate.62  
All these cases confirm that the notion of ‘family life’ in Article 8 is wider than the notion of 
‘family’ and that near relatives should be presumptively included if there are effective ties. 
Importantly, ‘family life’ is not defined in terms of unilateral dependency; consequently, the 
relationship between parents and their adult children should not be seen as less ‘familial’ if built on 
interdependence. Indeed Kroon v The Netherlands demonstrates that emotional bonds may be 
sufficient to establish family life even in the absence of either cohabitation or substantial financial 
support; according to the Court, ‘[t]here thus exist[ed] between [the child and his natural father] a 
bond amounting to family life, whatever the contribution of the latter to his son’s care and 
upbringing’.63 Close personal ties, recognized as a crucial feature of family life in cases regarding 
cohabitation, natural parenthood and near relatives, should not be marginalized in the analysis of 
cases involving adult children. Where such ties are present, Article 8 ought to extend at least to the 
relationship a person has with his or her parents, step-parents, siblings, grandparents and collateral 
ascendants, during and after that person’s minority (essentially, those relations recognized as 
exceptionally close by the consanguinity and affinity bars established by the law of nullity in 
virtually all European jurisdictions).  
In particular, it is submitted that the presence of the ‘signposts’ of family life identified in 
the case-law cited above (frequent contact, financial cooperation, emotional bonds) in a situation 
involving parents and their adult children ought to attract the protection of Article 8. The Court 
would still have the opportunity to exclude relationships where there is a mere biological 
connection not corroborated by effective ties, in the same way that it has done in cases regarding 
minors. In fact, even when minor children are the subject of an application, the mere biological link 
is not sufficient to establish family life in the absence of other factors, such as cohabitation, strong 
bonds or financial support. Thus, Article 8 does not apply to parents who have never been involved 
in their children’s life and committed to their upbringing (Yousef v The Netherlands),64 sperm 
donors who have never developed a personal relationship with the children born through assisted 
insemination to lesbian mothers (JRM v The Netherlands),
65
 or former lovers seeking a declaration 
of paternity in respect of children born to married women, although the latter are marginally 
protected under the ‘privacy’ limb (Schneider v Germany, Ahrens v Germany).66 The Court would 
therefore preserve the ability to perform a qualitative assessment of the relationship between adult 
relatives in order to determine if it amounts to ‘family life’. By contrast, an a priori blanket 
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exclusion, save for the most exceptional situations of dependency, means that the Court cannot 
conduct a case-by-case analysis, either as to whether the relationship amounts to family life or to 
decide if the interference was a proportionate one.  
A further argument in favour of a more expansive interpretation of ‘family life’ is provided 
by the stream of case-law regarding DNA testing for adult applicants desirous of establishing 
paternity. Albeit focused on private life, it suggests that family association is centred around a 
shared identity and transcends a person’s minority. In Jäggi v Switzerland, the Court thus found that 
the interest in discovering one’s parentage did not disappear with age.67 The Menéndez García v 
Spain decision further indicates that the need to establish grand-paternity is also covered by Article 
8, although a lesser degree of protection is available under the Convention, insofar as States retain a 
wider margin of appreciation.
68
 According to the Court, the interest in knowing one’s identity varies 
depending on the degree of kinship in the ascending line, with parents being of the highest 
importance, whereas the weight of such interest in relation to grandparents diminishes. Affiliation 
between an individual and their ascendants corresponds therefore to a life-long interest affecting the 
most personal sphere of anyone’s identity, and this continued relationship in adulthood should also 
be reflected in the understanding of ‘family life’. 
Finally, the Court has recognized that, where a child is born of a marital or de facto union, 
from the moment of the child’s birth and by the very fact of it, there exists between child and 
parents a bond amounting to ‘family life’;69 subsequent events may break that relationship, ‘but 
only exceptional circumstances can warrant the conclusion that the tie between a parent and his or 
her child is severed’.70 It should not be a foregone conclusion that a child’s coming of age brings 
“family life” to an end. 
 
2. Bridging the gap between legal and sociological perspectives on the family 
 
The Strasbourg Court’s narrow construction of the notion of ‘family life’ insofar as it concerns 
adult children and their parents stands in striking contrast with the sociological understanding of the 
family and actual practice in European countries. Intimate connections variously based on kinship, 
legal ties, commitment and emotional attachment have traditionally made it difficult for sociologists 
to produce a definition of ‘family’ capable of encompassing all the aspects that an individual would 
define as their ‘family life’. The scholarship has, nevertheless, been able to provide a theoretical 
framework by shifting the focus from defining the family as a social category to identifying family 
practices. Silva and Smart noted in this respect:  
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‘In th[e] context of fluid and changing definitions of families, a basic core remains which 
refers to the sharing of resources, caring, responsibilities and obligations. What a family is 
appears intrinsically related to what it does.’ (Silva and Smart, 2004: 7, emphasis added).  
Similarly, Diduck proposed adopting practice-based criteria for the recognition of familial 
relationships:  
‘For me, “family” is one way to describe forms or expressions of intimate or private living 
based upon care and interdependence.
 … What makes a relationship familial to me then is 
not necessarily a biological, legal, or conjugal connection, rather it is what people do in it, it 
is a relationship characterized by some degree of intimacy, interdependence, and care.’ 
(Diduck, 2011: 289, emphasis added). 
 
A Czech qualitative study conducted on school teachers indicated that, in order to explain the 
concept of family, most respondents would refer to descriptors which can be organised into seven 
categories: social roles (‘partnership’/ ‘raising children’/ ‘generation’/ ‘lineage’), emotions (‘well-
being’/ ‘security’/ ‘trust’/ ‘emotional needs’), responsibilities (‘organisation’/ ‘contribution’/ 
‘work’), being together (‘cooperation’/ ‘sharing’/ ‘belonging together’/ ‘coexistence’), economics 
(‘housekeeping’/ ‘management’/ ‘material security’), leisure (‘spending free time together’) and 
care (‘protection’/ ‘support’/ ‘relying on one another’) (Havigerová et al, 2013: 2511-2512). None 
of these terms – which overlap with the core of family practices described in the two definitions 
reproduced above – apply to the nuclear family exclusively. The relationships between children, 
parents and grandparents are equally characterised by care, sharing and contribution.  
Although it is primarily during their minority that children are dependent upon their parents, 
the latter continue to be a significant part of their adult children’s network of emotional and 
economic support. For instance, Herring pointed out that in the UK grandparents are the most 
important source of pre-school care after parents, and that according to a recent survey 44 per cent 
of children were receiving regular care from grandparents (Herring, 2015: 721). A study conducted 
by Douglas and Ferguson showed that mothers who work outside the home rely mainly on 
grandparents for the provision of childcare, a phenomenon all the more conspicuous given the 
significant growth in mothers’ employment rates over the past few decades (Douglas and Ferguson, 
2003: 42). For post-divorce family structures, grandparents are a crucial source of financial, 
emotional and childcare support, sometimes during the transition inherent in reorganising family 
life, but often also as a long-term solution; this is accompanied by both grandparents’ sense of 
obligation to assist and their children’s expectation to be offered assistance (Ferguson et al, 2004: 
103-108, 118). Moreover, sociological research on family background and educational success 
carried out in the US has revealed that grandparents play a distinctive role in the rearing of 
grandchildren; Jæger has thus argued that the effect of family background on educational success is 
not solely explained by the influence of the immediate family (the parents’ generation), but is to a 
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considerable extent ascribed to the extended family (grandparents in particular) and to the 
interactions between these two environments (Jæger, 2012: 918-9).  
As well as continuing to be a resource for their adult children in terms of providing childcare 
and financial assistance, parents are also reliant on their adult children when they reach an advanced 
age. In his partly dissenting opinion in the Slivenko case, Judge Kovler pointed out that the extended 
family is profoundly anchored in the culture of East and Southern European societies, so much so 
that a number of jurisdictions (such as the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Moldova) incorporate the 
obligation of adult children to support parents who are unfit to work in their fundamental laws.
71
 
This suggests that ‘in those countries the tradition of helping one’s elderly parents is firmly 
established as a moral imperative written into the Constitution’.72 Further examples of enforceable 
maintenance obligations in respect of ascendants can be found in the Belgian and Bulgarian legal 
traditions, confirming society’s expectation of solidarity within the vertical family (Van Houtte and 
Breda, 2005; Todorova, 2005). Although in other jurisdictions there is no legal obligation to 
financially support an elderly parent in the same way that there is a legal obligation to support 
minor children, there is a sense of moral obligation and natural inclination to do so. As Herring 
noted, in Britain (and arguably many Western countries presenting cultural affinities) it is generally 
accepted that children owe a moral obligation to their elderly parents, even though the rationale 
might be obscure and a precise equivalent in a legal obligation may be absent (Herring, 2015: 725).  
The relationship between adult children and their parents is consequently best described in 
terms of mutuality, with valuable contributions and with vulnerabilities on both sides. Indeed, 
empirical studies suggest that the modern extended family, based on intergenerational care, whether 
or not within the same household, is a widespread social model (Bornat et al, 2004: 115-128). To 
reflect that reality, interdependence (broadly defined) rather than unilateral and strict dependency 
ought to be the criterion governing the understanding of  ‘family life’ in Strasbourg case-law. 
Additionally, evidence of a special regime applying to adult children and their parents even 
when they operate as separate households can be found in certain aspects of domestic law. Thus, the 
presumption of advancement between parent and child at common law (which means inter alia that 
no resulting trust arises where a parent contributes to the purchase price of a home for their adult 
child) is predicated on the idea that parents and children continue to have a relationship governed by 
family law rather than general property rules (including equitable doctrines). Another example is 
furnished by the area of family provision for adult children; English law contemplates inheritance 
by adult children on intestacy (s. 46 Administration of Estates Act 1925), as well as challenges to 
wills or to the operation of intestacy rules by the deceased’s adult children (s. 1 Inheritance 
(Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975).
73
 Moreover, it is quite telling that statutory law 
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recognises parents as ‘dependants’ for certain purposes regardless of de facto financial dependency. 
For instance, under s. 1 Fatal Accidents Act 1976, in England and Wales a ‘dependant’ legitimated 
to bring an action for damages in case of wrongful act causing death includes ‘any parent or other 
ascendant of the deceased’, without further requirements.  
Significantly, immigration rules tend to allow, subject to various criteria depending on the 
jurisdiction considered, a more favourable treatment for a resident’s family members (including 
parents) who apply for an entry visa. For example, under the Immigration Rules part 8, a person 
settled in the UK may be joined by parents or grandparents aged 65 or over who have no other close 
relatives in their own country to whom they could turn for financial support, as long as the resident 
is able to provide adequate accommodation and maintain them without recourse to public funds.
74
 
The British approach is not an isolated example. In fact, Carens has pointed out that many 
democratic States around the world, albeit not all, permit citizens and residents to bring in a non-
national parent, especially where parents are elderly or dependent or without other children in their 
home country (Carens, 2013: 189). It would therefore not be inconceivable for the Strasbourg Court 
to construe an argument around States’ practice as regards the eligibility of adult relatives for 
indefinite leave to remain. Without establishing a positive right to join or be joined by a parent in 
the host country, this evidence would allow the Court to recognise such relationships as family life 
according to the same test used in cases involving couples and minor children: biological ties, legal 
ties, emotional attachment, economic support.  
Furthermore, from a sociological perspective, what distinguishes families from other forms of 
association pertaining to an individual’s private life is an enduring emotional connection. To treat it 
as entirely irrelevant for the purposes of ascertaining the existence of family life between adult 
relatives under the Convention does not appear defensible. The over-emphasis on dependency at the 
expense of emotional ties was forcefully criticised by Judge Spielmann in his partly dissenting 
opinion in Shevanova v Latvia:  
 
‘Giving precedence to the criterion of dependency to the detriment of that of normal affective 
ties strikes me as a very artificial approach to determining the existence of “family life”. It 
seems inconceivable to me that so little importance can be attached to the affective ties 
between a mother and her son that they can fall outside the scope of “family life”’.75 
 
In light of all the above considerations, the Court’s dismissive attitude towards emotional ties 
and intergenerational care as being conducive to ‘family life’ is inconsistent with social reality (and 
aspects of domestic laws reflecting and accommodating that reality). The dissenters in Senchishak v 




‘The notion of “core family” and the level of preserved emotional ties between parents and 
separated adult children vary across the cultures and traditions of Europe as well as among 
individuals living in various countries. … A time comes when elderly parents do need the 
loving care of their adult children and actually receive it as a matter of moral duty and 
preserved feelings of affection. To deny this is to hold that once an individual comes of age, 
the emotional ties with his or her parents are to be considered once and for all de facto and de 
jure severed and that for this reason neither a moral nor a legal duty to provide care may be 






Not surprisingly perhaps, the cases in which the Strasbourg institutions have established and 
consolidated their restrictive approach to relationships between adult children and their parents are 
by and large concentrated in a sovereignty stronghold: immigration proceedings. This would 
suggest that the Court might have adopted this stance primarily as a matter of judicial pragmatism. 
In fact, the Court tends to embrace a politicised assessment of the Convention law in immigration 
cases in general, including a proportionality test skewed in favour of the State, as a means to ensure 
that it does not alienate the contracting parties.
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Regrettably, this also affects the very understanding of what constitutes family life for the 
purposes of Article 8. As Kilkelly noted, in purely domestic cases the Court has included wider 
categories of family members within the scope of this provision, whereas ‘a strict line is taken on 
the existence of family life in immigration cases, particularly those involving family reunification, 
where the burden is on the applicant to establish that such a relationship exists’ (Kilkelly, 1999: 
217). Even accepting the dependency nexus as necessary in order to create family life between adult 
relatives, the current assessment of dependency is too narrow to reflect normal family dynamics. 
Significantly, the exceptional cases where the Court was prepared to find that nexus satisfied (Anam 
v UK, Emonet v Switzerland, F.N. v UK) concerned a dependent adult child (or orphaned niece) 
afflicted by a serious disability. Dependent parents seem to have an uphill task persuading the Court 
that there is family life between them and their adult children even in the presence of a disability. It 
is particularly disconcerting to read the Court’s contention in Senchishak v Finland that an elderly 
disabled mother is not dependent on her adult child to the extent that private and public care 
institutions are available. On that analysis, even minor children cannot be said to be their parents’ 
dependants, in fact that responsibility can also be delegated to private or public foster care 
arrangements. Nor does the applicability of ‘private life’ to parent/ adult child relationships mitigate 
this problematic assessment of the scope of ‘family life’; in fact, it has been shown above that it 
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only features in cases concerning the deportation of long-term residents, whose extensive links in 
the host country engage private life regardless of the recognition of a relationship with adult 
relatives, which remains inconsequential. There is also a logically inconsistent double standard in 
the application of the strict dependency test to first-entry cases but not to expulsion cases. For 
socially integrated deportees, family life with adult relatives is either recognised as such, with no 
qualitative threshold, or absorbed by private life, whereas law-abiding citizens, with extensive 
‘private life’ ties in the host country, cannot invoke family life with adult relatives seeking family 
reunification. Whilst State sovereignty and the desire to maintain States’ cooperation with the Court 
may be legitimate concerns in Strasbourg deliberation, they should not distort the very definition of 
family life. That definition should not vary depending on how politically sensitive the issue at hand 
is perceived to be.  
The reluctance of Council of Europe States to accept binding obligations vis-à-vis migrants’ 
right to family reunion with spouses and children has not prevented the Court from taking a more 
rights-protective approach as regards the core family. The development of jurisprudence 
safeguarding family interests that conflict with immigration policies
78
 has occurred notwithstanding 
the fact that, as Cholewinski observed, international instruments invoking the principle of family 
reunion ‘do not go so far as to recognize it as a right’ (Cholewinski, 2002: 275). The European 
Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers establishes very limited obligations
79
 and has 
achieved a particularly low level of ratification (11 parties since its opening for signature in 1977). 
Furthermore, the 1996 European Social Charter, ratified by a small Council of Europe majority (33 
parties), only requires States to ‘facilitate as far as possible’80 the reunion of the family of a lawfully 
established worker. This ostensible lack of commitment to family reunification in international 
treaty practice has not prevented the Court from finding that Article 8 requires States to avoid 
disproportionate interferences with family life, even though the enforcement of immigration rules 
for the economic well-being of the community has been accepted as a legitimate ground for 
interference.
81
 Once it has ascertained that immigration laws are not immune from human rights 
challenges, the Court should take a consistent approach in respect of adult children and their parents 
rather than treating them as strangers for the purposes of Article 8.  
A reconsideration of this area of law is further warranted by the fact that ‘population aging is 
a key feature of twenty-first-century demographic trends’ (Murphy, 2017: 257). In the context of 
this ageing European population, studies have shown that ‘informal networks [of family support] 
fulfil an important role in providing care to elderly persons’, particularly in Southern Europe  
(Lyberaki et al, 2013: 8). In countries, such as the UK, where the phenomenon of population ageing 





familial care becomes essential in meeting those needs, and hence relationships between adult 
members of the original family deserve recognition in law and policy. 
A better view on Article 8 would be to concede that more extensive interferences may be 
permitted with the enjoyment of family life by parents and their adult children when compared to 
the nuclear family. Conversely, denying the very applicability of Article 8 to such relationships, 
save for the most exceptional circumstances, is an unwarranted restriction, which places any and all 
interferences outside judicial oversight. The rigid definition of family life between adult relatives as 
based on strict dependency (typically for the purposes of family reunification) is at odds with the 
well-established signposts of ‘family life’ in Strasbourg cases without a cross-border element, most 
notably the emphasis on effective bonds. It is also inconsistent with social practice in European 
countries, as reflected in the sociological literature exploring the meaning of ‘family’. In fact, an 
understanding of Article 8 as exclusively protecting the nuclear family fails to take into account the 
adult children’s responsibility to care for their ageing parents (embedded in the culture and 
sometimes in the law), as well as the irreplaceable resource parents continue to represent in 
adulthood in terms of financial, emotional and childcare support. 
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v The Netherlands, App No 14501/89, ECmHR decision of 6 January 1992. 
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